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**Language in the Context
of the Theory of Social
Reality of John Searle**

Meditations and concepts of philosophers of the XX century suggest that the power of language stretches to such extent that language creates reality in some specified sense. The power of word is huge if not to say determinative as regard to one or another objective reality. It should, however, be recognised that the relation of language and reality is notable for specific complexity. If summarize changes in philosophical thought, it is possible to define a triad within which the philosophy considers the language phenomenon. This triad is 'consciousness - language - society'. In the XX century the language problem became increasingly important in this triad and gained in authority influence.

Key words: social reality, language, mind, power, collective intentionality, status functions.

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**Джон Серлидің әлеуметтік
шынайылық теориясы
контекстіндегі тіл**

XX ғ. философтардың ой-толғаныстары мен тұжырымдары тілдің билігінің орасандығы соншалық – ол белгілі мағынада шындықты жасайды деген шешімге жетеледі. Сөздің билігі зор, тіпті қандай да бір пәндік шындыққа қатысты шешуші деуге де келеді. Дегенімен, сөз жоқ, тілдің шындыққа деген қатынасы ерекше күрделі болып табылады. Философиялық ойдың өзгерістерін қысқаша қорытындылайтын болсақ, философия тіл болмысын мына үштік тұрғысынан қарастыратынын анықтауға болады. Бұл үштік: сана – тіл – қоғам. XX ғасырда бұл үштік орасан мән мен ықпалға ие болды.

Түйін сөздер: әлеуметтік шынайылық, тіл, пікір, күш, ұжымдық, өнертабыс, мәртебелік қызмет.

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**Язык в контексте теории
социальной реальности
Джона Серли**

Размышления и концепции философов XX в. приводят к выводу, что власть языка простирается настолько, что язык, в определенном смысле, творит реальность. Власть слова является огромной, если не сказать определяющей относительно той или иной предметной реальности. Однако, безусловно, следует признать, что отношение языка и реальности отличается особой сложностью. Если попытаться достаточно кратко резюмировать изменения в философской мысли, то можно определить триаду, в рамках которой философия рассматривает явление языка. Эта триада: сознание – язык – общество. В этой триаде проблема языка в XX веке приобрела огромное значение и влияние.

Ключевые слова: социальная реальность, язык, мнение, сила, коллективные изобретения, статусные функции.

**LANGUAGE
IN THE CONTEXT
OF THE THEORY
OF SOCIAL REALITY
OF JOHN SEARLE**

Among deepphilosophical ideas of the last decades there are hardly such works, the authors of which arrogantly set themselves up to find a formula of the accelerated solution to the burning issues of the modern world and a person. On the contrary, in most cases philosophers consciously refuse common and direct decisions.

The key, in particular, lies in common for modern philosophy recognition of the fact that sources of in-depth problems to a large extent stem from a person himself and from his inner world. A person suffers not because he is not able to cope with some external problems, but because he is not able to cope with himself, with his own thoughts and consciousness. Therefore he has a hard time solving external problems.

A philosopher differs from other people not because he knows the truth which is beyond 'common' people's contrivance, but because he in a professional way analyses the implicit inmost recesses of the inner and social world, veiled from the superficial glance, and by means of language and consciousness he can clear up the notions, hidden in the depths of the unthought. In some situations the philosophy renders into other language the problems, hidden in common, ordinary language in order to clarify these problems. In general, language becomes a subject of focused attention of philosophers as in many cases the modern philosophy links the mere existence of philosophical problems to the fact of their rootedness in language, and resolution of such problems is associated with their reformulation when using more exact language.

Meditations and concepts of philosophers of the XX century suggest that the power of language stretches to such extent that language creates reality in some specified sense. The power of word is huge if not to say determinative as regard to one or another objective reality. It should, however, be recognised that the relation of language and reality is notable for specific complexity. Existence of one or another abstract name does not necessarily require the actual existence of such subject or phenomenon, and at the same time, the absence in one or another language of any name, certainly, doesn't mean the nonexistence of this subject. It can demonstrate the peculiarity of the language - reality relation.

If summarize changes in philosophical thought in the XX century, it is possible to define a triad within which the philosophy

considers the language phenomenon. This triad is 'consciousness - language - society'. In the XX century the language problem became increasingly important in this triad and gained in authority influence. The language problem has never been so actual and interesting to philosophers and representatives of other fields of science. Young sciences, studying the problems when language is at the origins, developed very actively in this period. Those are such sciences as linguistics, sociology, psychology, semantics, semiotics and others. Language was treated as the key element of the objective reality, revealing or hiding its secrets.

The modern conditions of the globalizing world set ambitious goals for us on production, accumulation and transfer or delivery of knowledge and information. Modernization and irretrievably accelerating technical progress, multicultural and multilingual modern society demand further improvement of information exchange. The communication tools, that form stereotypes and forms of thinking of the public, including language, accordingly require very careful analysis in all senses and respects. Due to urgent need the multicultural globalizing world creates new forms of communication tools, like the software programming language or world languages with a large number of international terms which shall not be translated into national languages. These languages become the reflection of today's culture, its rational need. Whether we like it or not, the dominance of such languages will be increasing in the globalizing world, with its developed leading countries, and each subsequent generation will perceive more and more such domination not as something alien, but as their own. However the principle of openness must dominate and will dominate in the modern world with its developing technologies, because this particular principle is capable to embrace and, of course, to rule a large number of people, countries and nations and therefore, to affect them directly or indirectly, to exercise their will and authority. Development of global network and the Internet is a fertile ground for this tool of authority. Posting some knowledge and information in global network is the most reliable way of advancing values, own culture and language. And within this framework the younger generation of Kazakhstani research scientists face a large-scale problem to close a big gap in this direction.

Indeed the part which is beyond the vital world has increased tremendously on account of the modern world conditions. A person is not able to assimilate flows of varied information falling upon him, and to assimilate this information. Thus it is not uncommon

that a person fairly well masters a language in which the information becomes available for him. It may be concluded that a language extent is always slightly more and wider than a thinking extent - thinking as the process which is own, direct and live asset of a person.

All the above circumstances of the modern society lead to big changes in language. Language starts performing new functions, creating a basis for formation of new sign systems. The understanding of language as the communication tool is supplemented with understanding of the language role in the thinking and cognitive processes. All thinking and cognitive processes and their results are implemented absolutely within the sphere of the language activity. Therefore research and analysis of language are very useful tognoseological research.

In mass society the process of socialization of an individual is inherent in 'dictatorship of language'. Society 'goes into a person' by means of language of mass communications. In the process of mastering such language a person is involuntarily taken captive of common opinions, ideas, prejudices, assimilates ready options of estimates of one or another public phenomena. In other words, automation or stereotypification of thinking of each separately taken individual in that particular society is carried out, and under conditions of mass globalization it is carried out in this global world with its social networks. Within this world the mass language has a total character, covering all life spheres. And in this sense, a person is absolutely powerless before this total power of language. However comprehension of this phenomenon led modern philosophy not to 'revolt' against language, but on the contrary to understand that by means of language a person gets the real opportunity to become a human being, and more than this, he gets the real opportunity to exercise the real power over other individuals. The structural character of language with its tools is the basis for implementation of power.

One more confirmation of the aforesaid is a very popular idea in philosophy of the last two centuries that language is the main factor forming the worldview, and respectively a position of a person towards the around world [1].

John Searle, an American philosopher and the Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley is one of the most often cited and widely known authors of the modern theory of social reality, and interrelation of language and power. One of his bright works is the book 'Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization', published in 2010 [2]. In this book

the author developed the ideas, earlier published in his work 'The Construction of Social Reality' in 1995 [3].

John Searle was formed in traditions of analytical philosophy, but in consequence of long research works he exceeded the scope of this tradition. One of the reasons for that is that he writes on various subjects though his colleagues prefer to concentrate on certain aspects of one or two subjects. For the long career Searle has written works on such subjects as language philosophy, consciousness philosophy, the nature and structure of social institutes, ontology, science and theory of causality [4].

But apart from the fact that he worked on all these subjects simultaneously, he could synthesise them all and form one 'big picture' of his philosophical concept. His position is considered to be reactionary. He responds against strong and world-renowned modern tradition of postmodernism which sometimes seems to set targets to destroy almost all pre-existent viewpoints - especially our sense of reality. Searle's position also overreacts the dominating point of view about consciousness in modern psychology and philosophy, according to which the matter of the nature of consciousness is completely ignored or isn't taken seriously because it can't give the accurate theory of explaining the psychical phenomena. Searle wonders why modern neurobiology, being directly engaged in brain function and using the cutting-edge research technologies, still is not able to provide a unambiguous answer to a question on the nature of consciousness.

One more reason why Searle is beyond the analytical philosophy is the fact that he speaks about the problems of language not only to the benefit of philosophers, but of linguists as well; he speaks about problems of consciousness not only from the standpoint of philosophers, but of psychologists as well; he speaks about problems of the social world not only from the philosophical, but also from the sociological point of view; and the fact that he speaks about causality and a scientific explanation of the social facts kindle not only philosophers' interest but also interest of scientists of a wide variety of spheres. As a result, his works are of interest to representatives of various fields of study and sometimes seem as having nothing in common [5].

In the book 'Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization' Professor Searle presents the detailed theory of social reality. According to this theory all social world is made by one type of logical-linguistic operations - declaration of status functions. The innovation of this theory is the attempt to explain all social facts and the origin

of all social institutes and phenomena on the basis of the one structure. According to Searle, all social phenomena, such as marriage, cocktail parties, money, laws and other components of the social world consist of one and the same similar base blocks. The scientist's earlier known theories, such as the speech act theory, the intentionality theory, the theory of rationality and philosophy of language became a basis for the explanation of the theory [2].

In his work 'The Construction of Social Reality' starting from Chapter 1 Searle actively speaks in defence of realism, meaning that there is the real world independent of our thought and speech, and he speaks in defence of the concept of compliance of truth that our true statements usually become the truth thanks to things that exist in the real world which exists irrespective of these statements. 'I think that realism and the matching concept are essential assumptions of any normal philosophy, without mentioning science, and I wanted to clear some of the reasons that make me think so', Searle states [3].

Almost in all his works including this one, Searle advances arguments in favor of the idea that there is a reality which is completely independent of us. Besides, he also protects the truth correspondence theory, as the author's method consists in investigating the structure of facts that make our assertions true and to which they correspond when they are true. Thus, for Searle the main metaphysical prerequisites are realism, the correspondence theory, the special epistemological status of natural sciences, distinction of objectivity and subjectivity in ontological and epistemological dimensions. At that Searle calls realism and the correspondence theory (the correspondence theory of truth) the indispensable prerequisites of any sensible philosophy. Searle's research is the search and the answer to the following question: what is the rank of the social world in the generic structure of reality? In other words, he addresses the ontological issue of reality, in particular, the ontological issue of the social world nature in which there is a person and a society. In this respect the realism is obviously an indispensable prerequisite for the solution of this issue and the prerequisite for scientific research. To understand the nature of social reality and investigate it, we have to be convinced of its ontological reality and epistemological objective 'tangibility'. Yes, the social world can have the ontologically subjective nature, but we should have no doubts concerning its epistemological objectivity. Social facts of the same ontologically subjective nature as regard to the real world, consisting of atoms and other particles, however having accurate epistemological objectivity as regard to collective

recognition of the existing social facts, can serve as the proof of it. Unlike postmodernists, Searle doesn't try to 'create concepts'. Generally, in all his works Professor tries to avoid an ambiguity while explaining the nature of one or another facts. He claims for a genuine explanation of the social reality structure. The main issue is the fact that the true description of the social world is the ultimate attainable task. In his research Searle extremely distinctively reasons his theories by the availability of objectively existing social facts, the indispensable prerequisite of which is the availability of objectively existing social reality. 'I don't attempt to design a model; I try to develop a theory which contains a set of important facts on how the society actually functions', Searle notes [3].

Despite the seeming simplicity of these theories (we suppose this is due to Professor's talent to state thoughts briefly, clearly and specifically, and at the same time extremely thoroughly, avoiding 'blurring' of thought and obscurantism in philosophy), John Searle's researches possess deep metaphysical loading. His theory of social reality covers wide layer of metaphysical problems, offering an accurate explanation of social facts. It is extremely difficult to argue with his arguments. It is obvious that the main objective of this work is to improve and amplify the theory earlier mentioned by the author - from the special theory to the general theory of social reality. At that the central role in creation of social reality is given to such phenomenon as declaration.

It is possible to summarize the fundamentals of social ontology according to John Searle's theory. The external world in which we live completely consists of physical particles and force fields. Most of them are systematized, and the science pursues them in general. Some of these systems are living, and some of these living systems have obtained consciousness. Intentionality comes with consciousness - it is one more key element of Searle's theory of social reality. Intentionality is an ability of an organism to represent objects and conditions of the world. The understanding of intentionality helps to understand how language works in general. From the evolutionary point of view, language is the top, built on the pre-language, biologically more primitive forms of intentionality. Belief, desire, hope and fear are all intentional.

A very important point in this theory is the understanding of ontological objectivity and subjectivity, and epistemological objectivity and subjectivity respectively. In ontological sense, 'objectivity' and 'subjectivity' are predicates of objects and types of objects, and refer to a mode of existence. In ontological sense, pain is subjective

because its existence depends on feelings of the subject. But compared to pain, mountains are ontologically objective because their existence doesn't depend on the perceiving or intellectual state [2].

We can do epistemologically subjective judgments about objects which are ontologically objective, and similarly, we can do epistemologically objective judgments about objects which are ontologically subjective. For example, the statement 'I've got a backache' is an epistemologically objective fact, but pain exists depending on the subject, therefore, such statement will be ontologically subjective.

This is a very important condition not only for understanding the theory of social reality, but also for research of consciousness and language, and speech acts. Searle notes that the problem of research of consciousness is in misunderstanding of this difference of objectivity and subjectivity. In particular, Searle asked neurobiologists a question on the nature of consciousness, and for a long time he got the same utterly dissatisfying answer. Consciousness is subjective, and science is objective, therefore there can't be a distinct objective scientific explanation for such phenomenon as consciousness. But in his works Searle denies this conventional tradition. He takes economics as an example. Economics is quite an objective science, however it investigates ontologically subjective, but epistemologically objective processes in human society, in fact, social facts and activity of social institutes, such as money for example. Searle demands to apply this approach for conducting the research of consciousness. He claims that there is a difference between the properties that we could call common to an object by nature and those properties that exist depending on the observer's intentionality, etc.

For example, cars, money, a flag of the state, etc possess a certain physical weight, color, consist of certain chemical elements, etc. - all these properties are inherent in objects, but at the same time the true statement about these objects will be that they are what they are for us, observers, i.e. cars, money, a flag of the state, etc. At that all these epistemologically objective properties depend on the observer. It is a car, money and a flag only because people use them as those.

We will draw conclusions for clarity of further research:

1. The existence of a physical object before me doesn't depend on my attitude towards it.
2. This object has many properties which are internal or peculiar to it in the sense that they don't depend on observer's or user's prescriptions. For

example, it has a physical mass and a chemical composition.

3. This object also has some other properties that exist only depending on intentionality of agents. In particular, it is its functional status. For example, it is a flag of the state or money. The author calls such properties 'dependent on an observer'. Properties, dependent on an observer, are ontologically subjective.

4. Some of these ontologically subjective properties are epistemically objective. For example, this not only my opinion that it is a flag or money. Their status function imposed by observers, is already objectively established fact.

5. Though the property to be money or a flag is the fact, dependent on an observer, the property to think that something is money or a flag (used as money, etc.) is internal for a person who thinks (uses money). Being money or a flag is the fact, dependent on an observer, but properties of an observer that allow him to create such properties of the world, dependent on an observer, is the internal property of an observer [3].

Properties, dependent on an observer, depend only on an observer's attitude. Properties inherent in object don't give an idea of an observer and exist irrespective of him. If to be more precise, properties of reality inherent in an object are the properties that exist irrespective of intellectual states, except intellectual states which are properties of reality also inherent in an object.

The author lays emphasis on differences between properties, inherent in object and dependent on an observer, because the social reality can be understood only in the light of these differences. Properties, dependent on an observer, are always created by mental phenomena of an observer, inherent in an object. These mental phenomena, like all mental phenomena, are ontologically subjective; and properties, dependent on an observer, inherit this ontological subjectivity. But this ontological subjectivity doesn't contradict the statement that properties, dependent on an observer, are epistemologically objective.

Taking all the aforesaid into consideration, according to Searle at the heart of social reality, in the course of joint activity there is ability of people to impose on rough facts of the world (i.e. inanimate facts) the mode of some ideal expediency, or as Searle notes - appoint status functions. For clarity we will note here once again that according to the above correspondence theory of truth the existence of rough facts doesn't demand any human institutes. Of course, the institute of language is required for establishing rough facts, but the statement of a fact should be distinguished from its establishment [2].

As a result, people create the new reality consisting of the 'institutional facts' on the surface of rough physical facts. Behind this new reality in the first place there is a collective intentionality, inherent in human community (as a result of biological evolution) or 'We are intentionality', and secondly what Searle names 'constructive rules' [3].

Constructive rules have a logical form: 'X must be considered as Y within the context of C'. The existence of constructive rules differs human sociality from collective behavior of animals. If the latter is subordinated to instinct, and its variability is limited, then people creatively design their reality, using agreements, but the main thing is that they practice free play behavior patterns on the basis of 'constructive rules'. According to Searle, these rules function like Wittgenstein language games, i.e. they are rather flexible, are never realized completely as the fixed contracts, and are capable to change creatively in the course of their consistent application (iteration). As a result, there are unpredictable nonlinear effects and the rules that initially serve to support the institutional facts, and can destroy them as well – for example, rules of monetary circulation and crash of monetary system. This is how people create and destroy the institutional facts of their world. From Searle's point of view, it is essentially important that all institutional facts are the facts dependent on language. Note that interpretation of this dependence is one of the most subtle aspects in Searle's theory. According to Searle the essence of strong linguistic dependence is in the nature of constructive rules – 'X is Y in C'. Here X is the rough fact of the world, say, a line on the earth or the line of stones, and Y is the ideal fact of collective consciousness, for example, a border between two communities. To make the rule work successfully, it has to be represented in the form of a collective intentionality. But language is, in fact, the only such form in which the rough facts of the world can be correlated to the facts of collective consciousness as language and consciousness are identical on their logical structure, as we have seen it earlier. In other words, on the ground that in speech acts the logical structure of conditions of consciousness is presented, Searle draws a conclusion that the same speech actions are capable to represent the relation of rough facts and the facts of collective consciousness in a way, significant for this consciousness. Let us pay attention that in his work devoted to social reality unlike 'Intentionality', Searle, by entering the concept of collective intentionality, thereby attributes to consciousness the status of special factuality, namely, factuality of institutional reality of collective consciousness, but

continues to insist on logical identity of language and consciousness [6].

In such a manner the theoretical strategy of Searle has changed. Consciousness is the special region of facts (institutional), but this peculiarity does not have a special logical status. From the logical point of view, these facts of consciousness have the same logical dimension (importance), as any other facts of language, i.e. rough facts of the world, allocated with value, as they are created under conditions of principle dependence, any joint activity of the language. Language plays an essential role in creation of institutional reality.

Even the simplest action of purchase and sale has big complexity. As the structure of the fact exists only depending on its representation, the complex facts demand complex system of representation for their existence; and language is such a difficult system of representation.

According to Searle neither generally valid thought, nor joint action are possible beyond language. It is possible to say that the notable spirit of Kant thought is present in Searle's theory by finding the necessity as the law of coordination of two incidents. In this case collective consciousness alone (ontologically) is accidental, rough facts of our world, their physical scale and dimension are also accidental, but the interrelation of that and another in the institutional reality of human life is necessary, and language is the way of presentation of this necessity. It is important that from the point of view of such understanding, language doesn't comprise the law of the 'predefined harmony', but in itself it is a special type of practice and game in which some harmony is shown as becoming in the course of joint activity and its history [7].

That thread of thought gains further development and even some form of theoretical reflection in Searle's work 'Rationality in Action'. Here Searle formulates his own understanding of the sense of rationality in relation to human behavior. From his point of view, the main line of human behavior consists in lack of continuous causality that binds belief, motives and actions in an integrated sequence. Or otherwise, the human behavior is always action under conditions of a gap. There are only three such gaps. The first one is related to the general comprehension of a situation and formation of the rational plan of action or preliminary intention. This process can't last eternally and assumes a conscious choice of some final basis. The second one is related to transition from preliminary intention to the action itself that assumes jump from preliminary intention to intention in operation. And, finally, the third one is related to

the temporary structure of operation and to conation, necessary to finish it. All three moments assume the solution of free will which fills a gap. As Searle believes, it is natural to human behavior to think freely motivated; however the last circumstance doesn't make it irrational. In this case the essence of rationality consists in necessary coordination of freedom and institutional reality, when fully functional act of man is possible. As we saw, language is a fundamental condition of existence of the institutional reality, and a special form of language action (the speech act), namely, "promise" acts as a fundamental condition of coordination of free will of a person and institutional reality of environment. This form establishes a specific class of institutional facts - "obligations" which, in their turn, are external rational basis of free will, i.e. such external basis which in appropriate cases becomes the internal motive at the proper time. By that a free subject, an individual indicates to its action the discrete structure, which is well proportioned to institutional reality. As Searle writes: "To organize our own behavior and to manage it, we need to create an entity class that is similar to desires on logical structure, but at that independent of desire. Briefly speaking we need a class of external factors of motivation which would represent the basis for activity. Such essences connect rational beings only assuming that rational beings freely create them as obliging themselves" [8, p.233].

From Searle's essential standpoint, the ethical reciprocity of free subjects and formal reciprocity as a result of the general significance of language are essentially inseparable as it is impossible to divide the process of human behavior formation and conditions of language formation. Language is a practice, including and not least of all the practice of freedom in the conditions of institutional reality. The essence of this practice is that, by making the promise, a person as if crosses some border and opens the new sphere of values from the point of view of the first person and already from this position allocates the trivial general significance of language with ethical sense of reciprocity of free subjects. In other words, a person studies freedom in diverse linguistic usage, creating new forms of obligations and representing them by means of promises.

Also, it is notable to mention Professor's attitude to the theory of a collective intentionality, which he considers to be biologically primitive phenomenon that can't be reduced to individual intentionality. Searle calls the attempt to reduce collective intentionality to individual intentionality as one of the errors of philosophical thought, and reduces its emergence to requirements of methodological

individualism. The simplest forms of social facts include simple forms of collective behavior. And any fact containing collective intentionality is considered to be the social fact.

Now let's go back to the role of language in designing the social reality. In work "Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization" Searle refers to a problem of functions of language in more detail. Functions of language include the following: specifying, communicative, representative, expressional, declarative and other functions. Searle provides an answer to a question about the main function of language which makes language to what it is: language couldn't be language at all if it didn't carry out the function of providing the mechanism which helps individuals to communicate with each other. That is the communicative function of language. Communication means exchange of information. But the term "information" is considered to be one of the most difficult, unclear and badly defined concepts of today's intellectual thought, causing a lot of disputes and discussions. For attaining clarity, Searle reduces this function to exchange of intentional states, reflecting information on the world around. He allows one individual who acts as a speaker to express his thoughts, and to the second one who acts as a percipient to comprehend them, i.e. to react, understand, accordingly change his behavior or mental affirmations. The act of communication wouldn't be possible without language.

Thereinbefore we mentioned the value of language in the course of designing the social reality. Transfer from rough state to institutional one is the linguistic transfer in itself because the X term now symbolically reflects something outside itself. But this symbolical transfer requires mental process. To possess a thought which creates transfer from the X term to Y status, there must be a thought carrier that possesses consciousness. We need something for thinking. Physical features of the X term are insufficient for the content of thought, but any object that can be conventionally used as the carrier of this contents can be used for creation of thoughts. Words are most suitable for it as they are appropriated for this purpose. But formally, any standard marker will do it. It is simple to think in words, but it is much more difficult to think in people, mountains, etc. because they have too many excess properties and they are too unrepresentable. We use real words, but we can also use word-like markers as thought carriers. For example, road signs, signs of computer programs, emoticons that are extremely popular in the last decade and so on. Language is epistemologically

necessary for creation of institutional facts of social reality. In the structure of institutional facts we impose the Y status function on the X term which doesn't carry it out due to its physical constitution. Creation of a fact of ontological subjectivity is quite a difficult process, and at the same time it possesses quite real epistemological objectivity in the context of social reality. We can't derive function or status out of physical properties when it comes to money, universities, professors and playing chess for example. For example to consider paper as money we must have some linguistic or symbolical way of representation of the created facts concerning functions because they aren't derived directly from physical properties of objects. In other words, recognition of the fact that it is money, requires that it is linguistically or symbolically presented [9].

So, in summary we shall provide a number of functions thanks to which language is necessary for designing social reality and thanks to which it is possible to understand the complex mechanism of social reality and possibility of social facts as such. First, language is epistemologically necessary for creation of social reality. Secondly, social facts have to be transferrable, and as mentioned above the mandatory condition of social facts is the existence of collective intentionality. For functioning of the system, the created facts have to be transferred from one person to another. And strictly speaking, language explicitly accomplishes this function. Even in simple cases of institutional facts, this transfer requires means of general communication, language, sign system as such. Thirdly, in real life the considered phenomena are extremely complicated, and presentation of such complicated information requires language. Even such obviously simplest activities as commodity-money exchange or conclusion of marriage has big complexity. As the fact structure exists only depending on its representation, the complicated facts demand complicated system of representation for their existence; and language is such a difficult system of representation of the created social facts. Fourthly, the considered facts remain irrespective of duration of belief and tendencies of the institute participants. The collective agreement as the result of a collective intentionality leads to creation of social facts and social institutes. Their continuous existence as existence of social reality in general, requires the means of representation independent of participants' state, ranked primitively to linguistic ones, and this representation is linguistic.

Certainly it is senseless to argue on the language significance from the standpoint of the modern

cornerstone of philosophy - the triad “consciousness - language-society”. But the analysis of the principles of these phenomena interaction, as well as the analysis of their essence in general, are extremely important. Revealing the trends and basic principles of action within collective and individual intentionality would help to understand and solve

many existing social problems, to unveil secrets of social harmony and social discord. Against the background of modern global changes and total instability this analysis could allow to predict possible options of social processes development, by applying fully effective research methods of epistemologically objective reality.

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