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WHAT IS AFFECT?

In this article, the relationship between affect and becoming in Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy is explored. It is argued that affects and becoming are closely linked, and where there is becoming, there is also affect. Conversely, the absence of becoming implies the absence of affect. The concept of becoming is described as a process of desubjectification, where the ego loses its boundaries and transforms into the unbounded entity known as the schizo. Various identities or names can be assumed by the schizo, each representing a zone of intensity that the schizo moves through and derives value from. These identities should not be interpreted as permanent identifications in the psychoanalytic sense, but instead as temporary markers that the schizo transitions through like a nomad. The fact that the schizo's state of being is pathological is emphasized, and it requires a novel analytical approach called schizoanalysis, which aims to comprehend the specific logic of becoming that defines the schizo experience. Overall, crucial concepts in Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy, such as the correlation between affect and becoming and the significance of desubjectification in understanding the schizo experience, are introduced in this article. It also highlights the importance of innovative analytical approaches that consider the fluid and boundless nature of the schizo's identity.

Key words: Deleuze, Guattari, affect, desubjectification, schizoanalysis, identity.

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Аффект дегеніміз не?

Бұл мақалада Делуз және Гуаттари философиясындағы аффект пен қалыптасу арасындағы байланыс зерттеледі. Аффекттер мен қалыптасу бір-бірімен тығыз байланысты, ал қалыптасу болған жерде аффект те болады деп дәлелденеді. Керісінше, қалыптасудың болмауы аффекттің жоқтығын білдіреді. Қалыптасу тұжырымдамасы эго өз шекараларын жоғалтып, шизо деп аталатын шексіз болмысқа айналатын субъективті процесс ретінде сипатталады. Шизо әр түрлі сәйкестіктерді немесе атауларды қабылдай алады, олардың әрқайсысы шизо қозғалатын және құндылықты шығаратын қарқындылық аймағын білдіреді. Бұл сәйкестіктерді психоаналитикалық мағынада тұрақты сәйкестендіру ретінде түсіндіруге болмайды, керісінше шизо көшпелі ретінде өтетін уақытша маркерлер ретінде түсіндіріледі. Шизо жағдайының патологиялық екендігіне ерекше назар аударылады және шизоанализ деп аталатын жаңа аналитикалық тәсіл қажет, ол шизо тәжірибесін анықтайтын нақты қалыптасу логикасын түсінуге бағытталған. Тұтастай алғанда, бұл мақалада делуз және Гуаттари философиясындағы аффект пен қалыптасу арасындағы корреляция және шизоның тәжірибесін түсінудегі субъективтіліктің маңызы сияқты негізгі ұғымдар берілген. Шизо сәйкестігінің сұйық және шексіз сипатын ескеретін инновациялық аналитикалық тәсілдердің маңыздылығы да атап өтіледі.

Түйін сөздер: Делуз, Гуаттари, аффект, субъективтілік, шизоанализ, сәйкестілік.

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Что такое аффект?

В данной статье исследуется отношение между аффектом и становлением в философии Делёза и Гваттари. Аргументируется, что аффекты и становление тесно связаны. Обратное, отсутствие становления подразумевает отсутствие аффекта. Концепция становления описывается как процесс десубъективации, когда эго теряет свои границы и превращается в неограниченное существо, известное как шизо. Шизо может принимать различные идентичности или имена, каждая из которых представляет зону интенсивности, через которую шизо движется и извлекает ценность. Эти идентичности не следует интерпретировать как постоянные идентификации в психоаналитическом смысле, а скорее как временные маркеры, через которые шизо проходит. Особое внимание уделяется тому, что состояние шизо является патологическим, и требуется новый аналитический подход, называемый шизоанализом, который направлен на понимание конкретной логики становления, определяющей опыт шизо. В целом, в данной статье представлены ключевые концепции в философии Делёза и Гваттари, такие как корреляция между аффектом и становлением, а также значение десубъективации при понимании опыта шизо. Также подчеркивается важность инновационных аналитических подходов, которые учитывают текучую и безграничную природу идентичности шизо.

Ключевые слова: Делёз, Гваттари, аффект, десубъективация, шизоанализ, идентичность.

Introduction

Affect is synonymous with becoming. Deleuze and Guattari are explicit on this point: “Affects are becomings.”¹ From this we can hazard the following generalisation, which perhaps can be considered the first ‘rule’ of schizoanalysis: *where becoming is, there affect shall be*. The contrary can also be stipulated, in the absence of becoming there can be no affect. As will be seen in what follows, becoming is a process of desubjectification whereby the subject ‘I’ ceases to be a bounded entity – the ego, in other words – with a defined relation to an outside and becomes instead an unbounded entity – the schizo, in other words – that knows a thousand different names (“I am God I was not God I am a clown of God; I am Apis. I am an Egyptian ...”).² These names have no meanings in themselves, however, they simply mark out the borders of zones of intensity which the schizo has moved through and derived a certain surplus value from. The names should not be construed as identifications, in the psychoanalytic sense, because the schizo does not retain any sense of an ‘I’ as such – the schizo moves through these identities in the manner of a nomad, stopping here and there, but never for long. Schizoanalysis was invented to try to read and map this state of being, which is essentially pathological, and grasp the specific logic of becoming that defines the schizo experience.

Justification of the choice of articles and goals and objectives.

If affects are becomings, then it is the logic of becoming that explains affect in Deleuze and Guattari’s sense of the word. Affects can be understood as ‘components’ or ‘segments’ of becoming, but first we still need to explain what is meant by becoming. Although Deleuze and Guattari often sing the praises of becoming, giving rise to the impression that it is an intrinsically desirable state of being, it is noteworthy that when they look for a text that exemplifies it as an experience they reach for Lovecraft. “In one of his masterpieces, H.P. Lovecraft recounts the story of Carter, who feels his ‘self’ reel and who experiences a fear worse than that of annihilation. ‘Carters of forms both human and non-human, vertebrate and invertebrate, conscious and

mindless, animal and vegetable. And more, there were Carters having nothing in common with earthly life, but moving outrageously amidst backgrounds of other planets and systems and galaxies and cosmic continua ...”³ As Carter merges with the cosmos he loses all sense of himself as a separate being, and that is for him “the nameless summit of agony and dread.”⁴ Carter’s becoming – his desubjectification in other words – results in not only the loss of any sense of an integrated ‘self’, it also triggers a turbulence of the now disaggregated component parts – i.e., the affects.

This turbulence, this becoming, is operational in the sense that it compels the ‘subject’ in different directions, which Deleuze and Guattari designate as becoming-animal, becoming-woman, and so on. This means, too, that the components themselves, i.e., the affects unleashed by the disintegration of the subject, also have properties that enable this direction-taking. To put it another way, under certain conditions (still to be specified) affect exerts a kind of *compulsion*, or better still a power, on the ‘subject’. It is Lacan, rather than Spinoza, that provides the lineage for this way of thinking about affect. In this iteration, affect can be considered a retooling of Lacan’s notion of the *objet petit a* (itself a retooling of Klein’s notion of the partial object). The key difference is that in the case of the schizo these affects, these part objects, cannot be thought to be either a fragment of a lost totality, or fragment of a unity in waiting.⁵ This is the first of several adjustments we have to make in our thinking in order to embrace fully Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of schizoanalysis. We have to set aside the ideas of the organic whole, the *gestalt*, the *gesamtkunstwerk*, even the *auteur*, if we want to grasp what Deleuze and Guattari are arguing here. For what they are proposing is a notion of the whole that is in some way independent of, or at least not dependent on its parts, and vice versa. If this sounds counter-intuitive, then think of a movie like the Jason Bourne franchise – does it matter that the action in one scene takes place in Syntagma Square rather than say Gezi Park? As far as the plot and story goes, no it does not matter at all. But the affect of the scene would be different if the location was changed, which is doubtless a key reason why the contemporary thriller is so globe-trotting, it enables the same story to be told over and over

¹ Deleuze and Guattari 198: 256.

² Nijinsky cited in Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 77.

³ Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 240.

⁴ Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 240.

⁵ Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 42.

again, with fresh locations providing the interest the story would otherwise lack after so many retellings. The burden of novelty is displaced from plot and character onto location. This example can be extended to include the specific shots and cuts comprising a given action sequence, e.g., why show that ancient monument when it neither figures in nor prefigures the action? The answer is that the image is an affect – it contributes to the ‘feel’ of the film, which is probably more important these days than the story.

Results and discussion.

In this regard it may be legitimate and useful to think of action films as ‘violence porn’, as has been suggested, but as Jameson argues this may well be an expression of a form problem rather than an indictment of its content inasmuch that the narrative of action films like the Bourne series have to enable them to at least “minimally evade the absolutely episodic nature of sexual pornography, whose intermittent closures are allowed to be a good deal more final.”⁶ The plot, or story, serves only to create the framework to set up situations in which the requisite explosions can occur, rather than offering any meaning in its own right. This is reflected in the ambiguity of the endings in these films: good does not triumph over evil, order is not restored, and the hero does not ride off into the set. Jameson’s reading of contemporary thrillers – his examples are *Die Hard*, *Lethal Weapon*, *Cliffhanger*, *Terminator*, and *Speed* – is thus very different to the reading he offered of 1970s thrillers in *The Geopolitical Aesthetic*, which turns on the ideological implications of the plot, rather than the raw look and feel of the sequence of images the films contain. In films like the Bourne series, all the plot has to do is satisfy “the demand for a succession of explosive and self-sufficient present moments of violence”, to the point where the demand for the plot vanishes.⁷ As the importance of story and plot wanes, so does the possibility of an ideological reading. Usually centred on the villain as the embodiment of everything the ideology of the film stands opposed to, such readings come unstuck today because contemporary villains are there to plug plot holes rather than drive stories, and it is always made clear that they are only the latest iteration of a pervasive and perpetual evil that can never be vanquished once and for all, for that would extinguish the possibility of sequels. Invariably the villains are

depicted as mad or what amounts to the same thing as far Hollywood is concerned fanatical, meaning their actions are not meant to be understood or to serve as an allegory for some larger geopolitical idea.

Jameson offers a more developed account of this thesis with specific reference to affect in *The Antinomies of Realism*. I should say from the outset that I don’t necessarily agree with his overall argument concerning the nature of affect (however this is not the place for that conversation), but I nevertheless find his account of affect in literature useful for my purposes here. He extends the idea articulated above of the separation between story and what might be termed detail, i.e., the meaninglessness of the distinction between, say, Syntagma Square and Gezi Park, in an action film. Jameson stages his argument by distinguishing between allegory and affect (he elsewhere refers to this as the difference between the meaningful and the meaningless), taking Balzac and Flaubert as his examples. In “Balzac everything that looks like a physical sensation – a musty smell, a rancid taste, a greasy fabric – always means something, it is a sign or allegory of the moral or social status of a given character”.⁸ By the time Flaubert began publishing, near to the end of Balzac’s life, such descriptions had become stereotypes, thus losing their capacity to act as allegorical vehicles. By the same token, freed from their allegorical burden these newly autonomous sensory descriptions become available to register a different set of meanings, which Jameson designates as affect. His point of reference here is Roland Barthes’ notion of the ‘reality effect’. These descriptions are autonomous in the sense that, as Barthes discusses, they appear not to serve any structural, or narratological, purpose in that they do not advance the story in any obvious way. To some observers they are considered superfluous, mere useless details, but as Barthes shows the opposite is the case. These bagatelle details – the texture of the fabric of someone’s shirt, the colour of their eyes, the brand of cigarette they smoke, and so on – are all signifiers of the real: they do not denote real things, rather they connote that we are in the presence of the verifiably real.⁹

Umberto Eco has shown that this ‘reality effect’, as Barthes calls it, is central to mass market fiction: the sensory details of Bond’s everyday life, his taste for Egyptian cotton sheets, specific vintages of wine, and cocktails that are shaken not stirred, collectively counterbalance the manifest

⁶ Jameson 2003: 714.

⁷ Jameson 2003: 714

⁸ Jameson 2013: 33.

⁹ Barthes 1989:148.

unreality of his exploits, which constantly test the limits of the reader's credulity. As Eco notes, Fleming skips quickly over the big events such as an attack on Fort Knox, but dilates lengthily and lovingly on desirable objects and experiences.¹⁰ In Eco's view, it is Bond's taste and sensuousness that appeals to the reader, that solicits our identification, not his adventures. Although they signify the 'real', these details remain, as Jameson insists, "unassimilable to meaning, to verbal and intellectual abstract (names) and to rational conceptualization as such."¹¹ That is to say, these details actively repel all forms of allegorical appropriation and narrative integration. In Jameson's view, they remain firmly on the side of the body (which he qualifies elsewhere as the body without organs).¹² As such, affect is essentially a language problem, or better yet a representational problem. On the one hand, we would not need a new term like affect if it did not gesture towards – rather than specifically name – an experience for which no word presently exists; but, on the other hand, if affect does in fact name a specific type of experience then it immediately ceases to function as it is supposed to, namely as that which points toward that which does not yet have a name. It thus enables us to think about types of experiences which lack proper names and at the same time seems to call upon us to find names for these hitherto nameless experiences.

Affect finds its place and its meaning through its opposition to what Jameson calls (for pragmatic purposes) 'named emotions'. His implication is that affects refer to a category of feelings (for the want of a better word) that elude the grasp of language, while emotions refer to phenomena that we think about in terms of names – love, hate, anger, pleasure, and so on.¹³ This provides the occasion to mention another adjustment we have to make in our thinking in order to embrace fully Deleuze and Guattari's notion of schizoanalysis and that is the need to set aside psychoanalysis's reliance on association and resemblance. Jameson's position is that affect cannot be assimilated by these means – it is a kind of anti-memory, as Deleuze and Guattari put it, in that it constantly exceeds all attempts to read it in associative or symbolic terms. Contemporary psychoanalysis (particularly Lacanians like Žižek) has tried to circumvent this shortcoming of Freud's hermeneutic program by focusing on abstractions,

so that the big Other, as Žižek puts it, replaces the father, and can therefore be emblemized in film by powerful symbolic figures. In the Bourne franchise there are any number of figures and institutions that could fit the bill – Abbott, Conklin, Treadstone, the C.I.A., American imperialism, the Washington consensus, and so on. But even if we allow this Oedipalisation of our reading of Bourne – despite all their misgivings about the Oedipal model Deleuze and Guattari are quite clear in saying that Oedipal statements do exist – it still does not explain the pleasure, or better the *fascination*, of the specific details of the film, by which I mean the explosions, the spurting blood, the cries of pain, the grunts and groans, and so on. The plot creates the situation that renders all these things necessary, or at least plausible, but in no way depends on them. They function as 'reality effects', which is to say they contribute to the production of the reality of the filmic world into which the viewer immerses himself. Their semiotic value is a kind of degree zero, as Barthes puts it, of the variety that says this is really real and you can tell because it looks and sounds real, no sensibilities have been spared, no gruesome detail has been omitted or airbrushed away.

The fascination these details exert are immanent to the details themselves – they do not evoke memories, or invite associations, they cannot be turned into symbols. They are in this sense meaningless and anti-allegorical. The ideological thrill derived from seeing good triumph over evil does not explain the desire to see evil bleed, or burn, up close and in full colour. These kinds of details take us well beyond standard ideological readings of the kind Jameson and Žižek have pioneered toward something that I want to suggest only schizoanalysis provides the means of analysing and reading. And one has only to compare the action films of the early 1960s with today's action films to see how important these details are to the overall 'feel' of the films. In contemporary thrillers like the Bourne franchise, but also the rebooted Bond franchise featuring Daniel Craig and Tom Cruise's Mission Impossible series, the explosions and crashes boom, and objects fly at great speed, the lights dazzle, and the camera is constantly moving, often in a vertiginous – don't look down – fashion. The editing is fast-paced, the shift between shots occurs at a dizzying rate, thus taking the reality effect to

¹⁰ Eco 1979: 167.

¹¹ Jameson 2013: 37.

¹² Jameson 2002: 713.

¹³ Jameson 2013: 29.

another level, one that relates to experience itself and not just objects. While the storylines have remained more or less the same since the 1960s, all turning on some form of conspiracy theory (usually in the form of some kind of shadow government within the government – Ludlum’s speciality – or global counter-government such as SPECTRE in Bond) as Jameson shows in *The Geopolitical Aesthetic*, the affective dimension of their *mis-en-scène* has changed dramatically. As evidence of this, one might compare the film version of *Three Days of the Condor* from 1975 with the 2018 TV series of the same name; or, the original made for TV version of *The Bourne Identity* with Richard Chamberlain from 1988, which is a very sedate affair by comparison with the often brutal Matt Damon version from 2002, despite the fact the story is essentially the same; or, perhaps most tellingly of all, the Bond films of the Sean Connery era with that of the Daniel Craig films.

I do not want to continue this thread of talking about films here because I want to return to the clinical thread I started with. However, I do want to note that the question all these filmic examples pose, which is germane to the clinical thread, is this: how do these unmotivated scenes work in the absence of a properly motivating narrative or story? It is not enough to say they function as affects because that tells us nothing about how they operate, it simply gives us label to use. Schizoanalysis offers more than that, I believe. Ultimately schizoanalysis is a theory of how affects combine to produce what I want to call a compulsion to act or more usually *feel* in a certain way. For instance, the “German preromantic Karl Philipp Moritz feels responsible not for the calves that die but before the calves that die and give him the incredible feeling of an unknown Nature – *affect*. For the affect is not a personal feeling, nor is it a characteristic; it is the effectuation of a power of the pack that throws the self into upheaval and makes it reel.”¹⁴ Such feelings, they go onto say, “uproot one from humanity, if only for an instant, making one scrape at one’s bread like a rodent or giving one the yellow eyes of a feline”.¹⁵ Along the same lines, Hofmannsthal’s Lord Chandos “becomes fascinated with a ‘people’ of dying rats, and it is in him, through him, in the interstices of his disrupted self that the ‘soul of the animal bares its teeth at monstrous fate’: not pity, but *unnatural participation*. Then a strange imperative wells up in him: either stop writing, or write like a rat ...”¹⁶

Three points stand out here – first, the notion of the ‘disrupted self’ (the ‘self’ thrown into upheaval in other words); second, the appearance of a ‘strange imperative’ (making one scrape bread like a rodent); and third, a strange new kind of feeling – unknown Nature and unnatural participation. As is clear from this handful of examples, affect is not simply a capacity to affect and to be affected, it is a much more powerful kick in the pants than that, as Lacan says somewhere about the notion of the drive. Affect is desire in its ‘pure’, ‘free’ or ‘unbound’ state.

There is a schizophrenic experience of intensive quantities [affects] in their pure state, to a point that is almost unbearable – a celibate misery and glory experienced to the fullest, like a cry suspended between life and death, an intense feeling of transition, states of pure naked intensity stripped of all shape and form. These are often described as hallucinations and delirium, but the basic phenomenon of hallucination (*I see, I hear*) and the basic phenomenon of delirium (*I think*) presuppose an *I feel* at even deeper level, which gives hallucinations their object and thought delirium its content – an ‘I feel that I am becoming a woman’, ‘that I am becoming a god’, and so on, which is neither delirious nor hallucinatory, but will project the hallucination or internalize the delirium.¹⁷

It is this ‘I feel’, this ‘intense feeling of transition’, which consists in the combination and circulation of affects, that becoming conceptualizes. It is this ‘I feel’ that schizoanalysis as a whole is dedicated to trying to understand and articulate as a functional logic and not an ineffable falling apart. Here we see an essential premise of Deleuze and Guattari’s project: “Delirium and hallucination are secondary in relation to the *really primary emotion*, which in the beginning only experiences intensities, becomings, transitions.”¹⁸ This state of being is unimaginable in the absence of the concept of the body without organs and its many cognates (plane of immanence, plane of consistency, and so on, which will be discussed in greater detail below). It is only on the body without organs that the impossible transitions implied by becoming-animal, becoming-woman, and so on, are possible. The implication of this claim, which is perhaps not immediately obvious but has important ramifications for our understanding of affect, is that affects are also unimaginable in the absence of the concept of the body without organs. Moreover, it also means that it is on the body

¹⁴ Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 240 emphasis in original.

¹⁵ Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 240.

¹⁶ Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 240 emphasis in original.

¹⁷ Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 18.

¹⁸ Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 18-19 emphasis added.

without organs that affects circulate – this is why the definition of affect as a capacity to affect and be affected is in a certain sense inaccurate: it fails to specify this detail. When Deleuze and Guattari speak of affect in this way, it is always in relation to the body without organs (this includes Uexküll’s famous analysis of the tick and its three affects).¹⁹

It cannot be emphasized enough that as far as Deleuze and Guattari are concerned, desire in its ‘pure’ state is explosive, dangerous, even terrifying – it can lead to madness and suicide in the individual and anomie and fascism in social forms. For this reason, every society since the dawn of time has created rituals, beliefs, practices, and so on, to ‘code’ desire in such a way as to domesticate it and render it ‘stable’. However, these stabilising processes are only ever partially successful, desire always escapes. In part, this is because absolute stability is stifling, and creative minds find ways of bringing a little chaos back into our lives. But for the most part, it is because desire is by its nature a productive force. The schizophrenic process – as Deleuze and Guattari call desire in its free and productive mode – destabilises all socially accepted modes of desiring and thereby releases ‘pure’ varieties of desire that Deleuze and Guattari variously name as affects, becomings, haecceities, intensities, partial objects, and so on. This is desire’s revolutionary potential. Affect is what the schizophrenic process generates – when desire is productive it produces affects. These affects fly off in all directions – like bricks they say – unless they are harnessed by assemblages, that render their production both sustainable and valuable. As Deleuze and Guattari state: “If we put forward desire as a revolutionary agency, it is because we believe that capitalist society can endure many manifestations of interest, but not one manifestation of desire, which would be enough to make its fundamental structures explode, even at kindergarten level.”²⁰ The revolutionary form of desire is one they align with what they refer to as schizophrenia, or more accurately the schizophrenic process, which should not be confused with schizophrenics, i.e., patients suffering from schizophrenia as an illness.

Schizoanalysis asks two questions of this pure form of desire: (1) Is there a discernible ‘logic’ to its destabilising force? (2) Is there a way out of, or at least a way forward in situations of profound destabilisation? As I will explain in more detail in

what follows, the concept of becoming provides the grounds for an answer to the first question and the concept of the rhizome provides the grounds for the second question. We are first introduced to the concept of becoming in opening pages of *A Thousand Plateaus*, but it isn’t until the second chapter which revisits Freud’s famous case history of the Wolf-Man that we begin to get a sense of what this concept is really about. Even then we have to wait several more chapters before the concept is explained in detail. It’s worth spending some time on the Wolf-Man chapter because it effectively lays out the problem-question for which the concept of becoming is the problem-answer – I put it this way because becoming is not a stand-alone concept, but I don’t want to complicate things too quickly by introducing all the components at once. Essentially, the case study of the Wolf-Man, which has been taken up by several critics since Freud (including Muriel Gardiner and Ruth Mack Brunswick who both also met with the Wolf-Man), is used as foil to expose what might be termed the structural limits of Freud’s method of interpretation and at the same open up a new area of investigation that calls for a new hermeneutic model. Here one can but agree with Jameson that Deleuze and Guattari’s anti-interpretation stance “amounts less to a wholesale nullification of all interpretive activity than to a demand for the construction of some new and more adequate, immanent or antitranscendent hermeneutic model”.²¹ It is the basic task of the chapter on the Wolf-Man to demonstrate why this ‘more adequate hermeneutic model’, which Deleuze and Guattari call schizoanalysis, is in fact required. It has to be said, too, that the case is easily made because as Deleuze and Guattari’s gleeful satirising of Freud’s interpretations makes clear psychoanalysis is not well-equipped to deal with schizophrenia. Freud himself acknowledged as much, blaming lack of access to schizophrenic patients as the reason he had not developed an adequate account of schizophrenia’s aetiology.

It is doubtful, however, that even with greater opportunity to engage with schizophrenic patients he would have been willing to give up on the Oedipal complex as a universal truth of all human behaviour. As I indicated above, Deleuze and Guattari do not dispute the existence of the Oedipal complex, but they do dispute its universality. And in the case of schizophrenic patients, they say it has

¹⁹ Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 257.

²⁰ Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 379.

²¹ Jameson 1981: 23.

no place at all. Freud's 1915 essay "The Unconscious" is Deleuze and Guattari's point of departure for their revisionary account of the Wolf-Man's case history. They credit Freud with making "an important clinical discovery" in identifying the difference in 'style', as they put it, "between neurosis and psychosis."²² But then accuse him of effectively turning his back on his own discovery by finding increasingly elaborate and ingenious ways of making psychosis look the same as neurosis after all. The crucial distinction between neurosis and psychosis, according to Freud, resides in the fact that while neurotics are "capable of making a global comparison between a sock and a vagina, a scar and castration" it would never occur to them "to grasp the skin erotically as a multiplicity of pores, little spots, little scars or black holes, or to grasp the sock erotically as a multiplicity of stitches."²³ This is illustrated in the work of Salvador Dali – when he speaks about the rhinoceros horn he remains firmly in the realm of neurosis, but "when he starts comparing goosebumps to a field of tiny rhinoceros horns, we get the feeling that the atmosphere has changed and that now we are in the presence of madness."²⁴ Deleuze and Guattari's implication here, which is in fact a cornerstone of schizoanalysis as a whole, is that *there is a difference in kind, not degree*, between the perception of a single rhinoceros horn and a field of rhinoceros horns. As such, the latter cannot be reduced to the former – a multiplicity of horns cannot be treated as though it were effectively, much less affectively, the same as a single horn, or what amounts to the same thing as the sum of multiple horns.

The focus of Deleuze and Guattari's dispute with Freud is his reading of the Wolf-Man's famous dream of five wolves in a tree outside his bedroom window from when he was very young and still living on the family estate in Russia. There are two key features of the dream about which their views diverge: first, the significance of the number of wolves; and second, the significance of the fact that it is wolves and not some other creature. For Freud, the fact that there are five wolves in the tree is essentially immaterial because his interpretive methodology enables him to explain that number away and end up with the equation wolf=daddy as we always knew that he would. The actual number of wolves is just an interpretive inconvenience for Freud. By contrast, for Deleuze and Guattari, the

number of wolves *is* crucial inasmuch that it indicates the presence of a pack, or rather a multiplicity, of wolves, that cannot be reduced to a single figure, i.e., wolf=daddy. Freud, they say, "obviously knows nothing about the fascination exerted by wolves and the meaning of their silent call, the call to become-wolf."²⁵ This brings us to the second point of divergence, where matters are much less clear-cut. For Freud the fact that it is wolves outside the Wolf-Man's bedroom is significant only to the degree that by virtue of their threatening nature they can stand duty as representatives of his castrating father. But any other similarly imposing – i.e., castrating – animal could serve the same purpose, so the wolfness of the wolves is unimportant to Freud.

For Deleuze and Guattari, though, the opposite is the case: the wolfness of the wolves is decisive inasmuch that wolves are pack animals and therefore inconceivable except as a multiplicity. However, this is where things become blurry though because despite all their bluster about Freud's failure to grasp the significance of the wolves as wolves Deleuze and Guattari are themselves really only interested in two aspects of the wolfness of the wolves: their pack nature and their wild status as undomesticated 'non-oedipal' animals. But even that overstates the case because they declare themselves to be uninterested in characteristics. "The wolf is not fundamentally a characteristic or a certain number of characteristics; it is a wolfing."²⁶ This does not mean that characteristics are irrelevant. Deleuze and Guattari acknowledge both that they are useful, in a scientific sense, and important in a clinical sense (the Wolf-Man's fascination for wolves would not make sense in their absence). But, in contrast to psychoanalysis, characteristics are not considered decisive, they do not serve an interpretive function. "The elements of the pack are only imaginary 'dummies', the characteristics of the pack are only symbolic entities."²⁷ Deleuze and Guattari reject the idea that the wolf is simply a stand-in for the father, but they do not for all that reject the idea that the wolves might stand for something besides themselves. But it is not their specific animal characteristics that matter. As such, the animal is never encountered for itself, but always as the avatar of what might usefully be described as an inner psychological tension. The wolf, they go on to say, is "the instantaneous

²² Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 27.

²³ Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 27.

²⁴ Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 27.

²⁵ Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 28.

²⁶ Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 239.

²⁷ Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 245.

apprehension of a multiplicity in a given region”, as such it is “not a representative, a substitute, but an *I feel*. I feel myself becoming a wolf, one wolf among others, on the edge of the pack.”²⁸ It is, in other words, a strange imperative, a feeling of transition (and by implication a feeling of undoing), that has manifested as a wolf-feeling, at least in this instance.

It is a very peculiar form of feeling. Even as the Wolf-Man feels as though he is turning into a wolf, he also knows that he is not actually about to do so. It is *this* feeling, this ‘strange imperative’, that becoming seeks to conceptualize and name. As Jameson says, this is “a historical proposition, but one about language itself and the way in which the nomination of an experience makes it visible at the very moment that it transforms and reifies it. And what is presupposed is that affects or feelings which have not thus been named are not available to consciousness, or are absorbed into subjectivity in different ways that render them inconspicuous and indistinguishable from the named emotions they may serve to fill out and to which they lend body and substance.”²⁹ The concept of becoming is clearly intended to render visible a very particular kind of experience – the strange imperative – and at the same time distinguish it from all other types of experience, particularly those identified and enumerated by psychoanalysis (which Jameson usefully refers to as the “psychopathologies of the ego”).³⁰ But, it also desperately wants to avoid the fate of reifying the thing it names and thereby turning it into something concrete that we think we can know. In this sense, becoming should always be understood to stand in opposition to emotion, or what Jameson more precisely calls ‘named emotions’, because what it seeks to name and bring into the light is a set of experiences that have hitherto escaped detection, or else – more usually – have been written off as mad, fantastical, horrific, and so on.

Every time we feel we are getting a handle on becoming in a concrete sense we need to take a step back and ask ourselves if we are being abstract enough. For instance, the Wolf-Man’s fascination with wolves should not be confused with the named emotion fear, in either its Freudian or Heideggerian senses. Although Deleuze and Guattari say that becoming-animal does not take

place “without a fascination for the pack, multiplicity”, that should not be taken to mean that this fascination is in some way causal. In contrast to fear, it is not the sight of wolves, as fearsome objects external to the subject, that triggers a becoming-animal.³¹ It would be truer to say that the Wolf-Man’s fascination is itself a sign that he has entered a state of becoming: he is fascinated *because* of his becoming-animal, not the other way round. Becoming is not a ‘normal’ state of affairs, it is something that happens to us, as though a switch inside our heads has been flicked. “It is because the hero of *Focus*, the average American, needs glasses that give his nose a vaguely Semitic air, it is ‘because of the glasses’ that he is thrown [précipité] into this strange adventure of the becoming-Jewish of the non-Jew.”³² Deleuze and Guattari go on to say anything can precipitate this change of mental gears – Massumi translates ‘précipit’ éas ‘thrown into’, but this seems unnecessarily Heideggerian and misleading to the extent that it implies that in becoming one enters ‘another world’, when in actual fact what happens is one begins to see and experience ‘this world’ very differently.³³ If anything can precipitate a ‘crisis’ of becoming, as it were, then that can only be because the ‘trigger’ is internal and not external – it is not the wolves that initiate becoming, but rather we know becoming has begun when the Wolf-Man not only notices the wolves but becomes fascinated (which is to say obsessed) by them. Deleuze and Guattari do not give much weight to this word ‘fascinate’, so we can only assume it holds no conceptual value, save that it indicates a change in the way a subject views the world. “You don’t deviate from the majority unless there is a little detail that starts to swell and carries you off.”³⁴ Ultimately, it is the idea of a change in the mode of perception that is central to the notion of becoming.

Indeed, I would go so far as to say that before it is anything else, *becoming is a change in the mode of perception*, a change not only in what one sees, but more fundamentally in *how* one sees. In order to understand what Deleuze and Guattari mean here it may be helpful to think of becoming as shift in register, or better yet modality, for that is effectively what it is: in becoming one moves, usually suddenly, between one way of seeing and

²⁸ Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 32.

²⁹ Jameson 2013: 34.

³⁰ Jameson 1991: 15.

³¹ Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 240.

³² Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 292.

³³ Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 292.

³⁴ Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 292.

encountering the world, into another way of seeing and encountering the world whose rules are distinctly different. In the grip of becoming there is no longer an 'I' who sees, thinks, and believes, there is only 'I feel' as a continuum of affects. To grasp a sock erotically at the level of the stitches, as the Wolf-Man does, is to enter a whole new way of seeing things, one that cannot be rationalised in terms of resemblances or symbols. The sock does not remind the Wolf-Man of anything, it is erotic in and of itself. This is why, with reference to Dali, they don't hesitate to say that with this way of viewing the world we are in the presence of madness. There are two points to be made here: first, becoming is a mental process, or better a form of mental processing that determines how a person sees and interacts with the world (becoming occurs "within us"³⁵); second, becoming is not in and of itself pathological, but in the absence of any other forms of mental processing, its effects can be deleterious. At its extreme, becoming manifests as delirium and paranoia, which can be debilitating experiences for the afflicted. Deleuze and Guattari do not explicitly state that becoming is a pathology, but there are very clear indications in their work that this is what they think (besides the obvious point that all their examples are drawn from clinical cases of schizophrenics). Indeed, becoming is frequently linked to death, as we'll see in a moment.

Deleuze and Guattari see this movement between registers of perception as a movement between two planes of existence: the plane of organisation and the plane of consistency. *This point is so pivotal for schizoanalysis* it can legitimately be regarded as one of the *foundational premises of schizoanalysis*. This is amply evidenced by the fact that the distinction between the plane of organisation and the plane of consistency (also known as the plane of immanence, the plateau, the body without organs, the earth, multiplicity, and smooth space) is recapitulated and reiterated countless times in *A Thousand Plateaus* – it underpins the distinction they draw between sedentary and nomad, molar and molecular, tool and weapon, royal and nomad science, reterritorialization and deterritorialization, pulsed and non-pulsed, arborescent and rhizomatic, and so on, the list is practically endless. Indeed, once you begin to pay attention to this particular binary it seems as if that is all they talk about and in a very real sense it is. These two planes correspond to two radically different ways of perceiving the world: for strictly heuristic

purposes, the first plane (of organization) can usefully be thought of as the standard (non-pathological) way of seeing the world, while the latter (immanence) is the non-standard and potentially pathological way of seeing the world. Becoming can then be understood as the shifting of mental gears whereby the second plane gains ascendancy over the first and as Marx famously put all that is (or at least appeared) solid melts, and forms give way to flows. The two planes effectively function as each other's limit – where one gives rise to the development of subjects and forms (organization), the other undoes subjects and forms and sets in motion dynamic flows of affects; similarly, where one (immanence) gives rise to flows of affects, the other captures these and moulds them into forms and subjects. In *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the limit of capitalism (plane of organization) is schizophrenia (plane of immanence) and that capitalism constantly seeks to exceed its own limits by dismantling its forms and unleashing flows. In this regard, it can be said to court disaster in the name of growth.

The plane of organization is constantly working away at the plane of consistency, always trying to plug the lines of flight, stop or interrupt the movements of deterritorialization, weigh them down, re-stratify them, reconstitute forms and subjects in a dimension of depth. Conversely, the plane of consistency is constantly extricating itself from the plane of organization, causing particles to spin off the strata, scrambling forms by dint of speed or slowness, breaking down functions by means of assemblages or microassemblages. But once again, so much caution is needed to prevent the plane of consistency from becoming a pure plane of abolition or death, to prevent the involution from turning into a regression to the undifferentiated.³⁶

The dynamic nature of this relationship should be borne in mind as I turn now try to explicate the difference between the two. Here one might think of the dynamic relationship between a musical score (plane of organization) and its performance by a musician (plane of consistency) – the latter does not reproduce the former, it gives it life by introducing all manner of subtle variations to the score as written.

Boulez speaks of proliferations of little motifs, accumulations of little notes that proceed kinematically and affectively, sweeping away a simple form by adding indications of speed to it; this allows one to produce extremely complex

³⁵ Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 275.

³⁶ Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 270.

dynamic relations on the basis of intrinsically simple formal relations. Even a *rubato* by Chopin cannot be reproduced because it will have different time characteristics at each playing. It is as though an immense plane of consistency at variable speed were forever sweeping up forms and functions, forms and subjects, extracting from them particles and affects.³⁷

Music offers perhaps the most straightforward exemplification of what Deleuze and Guattari mean by plane of organization because it exhibits its key feature, namely the fact that it can only be inferred. The plane of organization never appears for itself. “It may be in the mind of a god, or in the unconscious of life, of the soul, or of language: it is always concluded from its effects.”³⁸ The compositional principles of music, particularly western classical music, give structure to a piece of music but are not by themselves audible in the music obeying those principles. We hear the effects of harmonic scales and time signatures, but do not hear them. “The plan(e) can always be described, but as a part aside, as ungiven in that to which it gives rise.”³⁹ Outside of music, one can see that architecture too exemplifies this principle – the compositional principles of material, load and gravity, not to mention facility and function, are only ever visible in their effects. Similarly in literature and film, the narrative arc is composed of interlocking fragments (words and images) that do not in and of themselves exhibit the principle of composition that gave rise to them. This is true even of a single sentence. The plane of organisation is paradoxical in this regard in that it is never audible or visible for itself, but nevertheless gives rise to forms and subjects that are audible and visible.⁴⁰ As such, it is to be found everywhere and seen nowhere.

By contrast, on the plane of consistency everything is on the surface.⁴¹ The plane of consistency has four defining characteristics: to begin with, it is a plane of noncontradiction, which is to say it is a plane on which contradiction is impossible. It shares this characteristic with dreams, as Freud analyses them, but with an important twist. The locus classicus in this regard is Freud’s reference to what has become known as the ‘kettle defence’ in his account of his dream of Irma’s injection, the dream Freud credits with

revealing to him the secret of dream analysis. Charged with returning a neighbour’s kettle in a damaged condition, a man offers three lines of defence: first of all, he says, he gave it back undamaged; second, the kettle already had a hole in it when he borrowed it; and anyway, he never borrowed the kettle. Obviously enough, it is possible that one of these three lines of defence could be true, though there’s no actual evidence to confirm things one way or another, but it is impossible for them all to be true because each one contradicts the other. Either the kettle was damaged, or it wasn’t; either he borrowed it, or he didn’t; and so on. For Freud these contradictions are unimportant, because read together one can see that underpinning all three of these defences is a singular plea to be excused of the charge. He was reminded of this tale by the fact that in his own dream he’d convinced himself that he was not to blame for his patient Irma’s suffering because (a) she’d refused his treatment; (b) her pain wasn’t psychological, so it wasn’t really something he could deal with; and (c) her pain was attributable to her recent widowhood, about which he could do nothing in any case. He was perhaps being unkind to himself in equating his self-justifications with the kettle defence, inasmuch that these three lines of defence do not contradict one another, but for our purposes here what is noteworthy is the fact that he explains away the altogether suspicious proliferation of defences (the therapist doth protest too much!) by power of a single underlying aim to be excused, which is not in evidence for itself.⁴²

Three further characteristics of the plane of consistency can be adduced from this example of the kettle defence. It is a “plane of proliferation”⁴³ – one excuse is followed by another without regard for logic or credibility, or indeed number – that he stops at three excuses is purely arbitrary, it could just as easily have been more. Proliferation, for Deleuze and Guattari, refers to the multiplication of differences, or deviations, from the ‘standard’ line found in, or produced by a specific assemblage, to the point where that assemblage begins to disintegrate. With each more outrageous and contradictory defence offered, the kettle borrower moves further and further away from reason, until reason itself ceases to have meaning. At that point, the multiple of defences becomes a

³⁷ Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 271.

³⁸ Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 266.

³⁹ Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 266.

⁴⁰ Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 265.

⁴¹ Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 266.

⁴² Freud 1976: 196-197.

⁴³ Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 267.

multiplicity. Multiplicity and multiple are not the same thing – this point is foundational for schizoanalysis. Bear in mind, too, that multiplicity is just one of several synonyms for the plane of consistency. From the foregoing, it may appear that multiplicity is reached via addition, but in fact the opposite is the case: it is subtraction that yields multiplicity and proliferation is the means. The multiplicity, which Deleuze and Guattari often write as $n-1$, is reached by subtracting the ‘unique’, by which they mean anything that in principle prevents something from morphing into – i.e., becoming – something else. The law of noncontradiction is a perfect example of this: insofar as that law is in place, the kettle defendant is compelled to choose between their defences and decide which one they want to go with – the totality of their defence options is a multiple. But once this law is removed, the defendant is free to pile defences on top of one another to the point of insanity – at this point, the multiple becomes a multiplicity.

Multiplicity had a long gestation period in Deleuze’s work prior to his collaborations with Guattari, but there is a knight’s move between the various iterations of the concept rather than a straight line of progression or development. This point is fundamental: multiplicity in *Difference and Repetition* (which is the most important and developed instance of Deleuze’s thought on multiplicity) prepares the way for and clearly informs the elaboration of multiplicity in *A Thousand Plateaus* (which is the most important and developed instance of Deleuze and Guattari’s thought on multiplicity), but they are not therefore exactly the same concept. As I mentioned at the outset of this chapter, all concepts have a history, which in practical terms means they are subject to variation, as Deleuze and Guattari show in *What is Philosophy?*, which means they can and do undergo internal transformations, and thus develop different trajectories and emphases without thereby becoming completely new concepts.⁴⁴ As is the case with the concept of the body without organs, it can and should be said that although multiplicity first of all featured in Deleuze’s work, it finds its fullest meaning in his collaboration with Guattari. The early iterations of Deleuze’s thinking about multiplicity, particularly in his book on Bergson and more especially *Difference and Repetition*, are not superseded, much less negated, by his collaborations with Guattari, but stand as reminders of just how complex the concepts are in

their fully worked-out forms. Deleuze seems not to have regarded any of his work as definitive or fixed. So, when he and Guattari confronted what might be termed the phenomenology of schizophrenia as a practical problem, he happily retooled his concept of multiplicity to serve this new purpose. And as we’ve seen, it usefully encapsulates a state of affairs in which the proliferation of statements have eaten away at the identity of the discursive formation from which they issued in such a way that they constitute a new kind of entity, one that has dimensions but not coordinates.

If the version of multiplicity found in *A Thousand Plateaus* is not the same as the version found in *Difference and Repetition*, then it stands to reason that multiplicity as Deleuze and Guattari conceive it will not be the same as versions of the concept found outside of their work. The fact is, Deleuze and Guattari did not derive this concept from a single source, so there is no ‘outside text’ or ‘supplementary text’ (to recall Derridean tropes), and this very much includes *Difference and Repetition*, which we can trace back to and claim it explains everything and thereby resolve any problems we may have in grasping the concept as they formulate it. Indicatively, they note that both Bergson and Husserl put forward theories of multiplicity which closely resemble one another, but they do not clarify whether their own theory of multiplicity is the same or indeed differs from these possible prototypes.⁴⁵ If they allow that Bergson is more important to them than Husserl (not to mention Meinong and Russell, as well as Reimann and Lautman, whose theories of multiplicity they also canvas), that should not be taken to mean that Bergson’s contribution is decisive.⁴⁶ The paradoxical conclusion one is forced to reach here is that their version of multiplicity should be regarded as being neither Bergsonian nor Husserlian (nor Meinongian, etc.), but also neither not-Bergsonian nor not-Husserlian (nor not-Meinongian, etc.). This is because, as they make explicit, Bergson *et al* is merely a starting point. It enables them to make headway with a particular problem that interests them but does not by itself provide a solution. Of their very brief accounts of Bergson, Husserl, Meinong, Russell and Lautman, Deleuze and Guattari say merely that it provides “the logical foundation” for what they want to do.⁴⁷

This brings us to the third characteristic of the plane of consistency – i.e., of both becoming and multiplicity (since they’re the same thing) – that

⁴⁴ Deleuze and Guattari: 1994: 18.

⁴⁵ Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 226n9.

⁴⁶ Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 483.

⁴⁷ Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 33.

can be derived from the kettle defence. There is no logical connection between the defences, such that one either begets another, or combines with it to produce a 'higher' form (Freud's self-defence differs in this regard because his excuses do in fact roll together to yield a 'higher' form). For this reason, one cannot 'trace' backwards from one dimension to another and thereby triangulate a 'starting point'. There is no kind of evolution between the dimensions. The kettle defence might just as easily (and plausibly) have begun with the assertion that he never borrowed the kettle. By the same token, the defendant could just as conceivably add that the kettle was not in fact a kettle and so on. Similarly, he could reduce the number of defences without altering the fact that none of the defences are strictly speaking rational in that there is no empirical evidence to support any of them. Clearly, too, none of the defences can be said to appeal to reason – on their own, they do, but taken together, as a multiplicity, the atmosphere quickly changes, and it becomes clear that we are now in the presence of madness. This is where the concept of the *rhizome* comes into play. The kettle defence has no structure, it does not build an argument in the traditional Aristotelian manner, whereby each point connects with the next in such a way as to create a prism of interlocking and ramifying arguments. Instead, the kettle defence "operates by variation, expansion, conquest, capture, offshoots."⁴⁸ One point does not follow another, but shoots off in a completely different direction – the kettle wasn't damaged, it was already damaged, he never borrowed it. There is no limit to the production of these defences, they can expand indefinitely because the usual limiting conditions – e.g., the principles of noncontradiction and reason – have been conquered and abandoned.

However, there are still other thresholds to be considered because there is a leap between saying the kettle wasn't damaged and saying something like aliens were responsible for the damage. Once the aliens enter the conversation the multiplicity undergoes a radical metamorphosis – this is what Deleuze and Guattari mean when they say a multiplicity cannot be added to without changing the whole. Deleuze and Guattari refer to these thresholds as borders. Becoming, they say, constitutes a phenomenon of 'bordering' because it

constantly propels a multiplicity towards a new metamorphosis – the wolves become wasps, then bees, and so on.⁴⁹ The wolves do not transmogrify into wasps or butterflies or penises or anuses or whatever, rather they are simply replaced as the constitutive elements of the Wolf-Man's multiplicity.⁵⁰ The change of elements in a given multiplicity is what Deleuze and Guattari mean by becoming. If the Wolf-Man is said to be fascinated by wolves, or wasps, it should not be thought that these creatures exist anywhere except inside his head. This is because the multiplicity that fascinates him (indeed all of us) is the "multiplicity dwelling within us".⁵¹ We will need to introduce the concept of deterritorialization to explain this more fully, but for now we can note that what fascinates us is first of all a movement, a turbulence even, within us. This fascination for multiplicity is neither a projection nor an introjection (two psychoanalytic concepts Deleuze and Guattari explicitly reject in *Anti-Oedipus*), but a state of being in which inside and outside no longer have any meaning. The multiplicity – wolves, wasps, whatever – is a figuration, for the want of a better word, of the libido – it is how the libido presents itself to us: we see wolves, but the wolves are simply the qualitative expression of the current state of the libido.

Conclusion

For Freud, the libido is a singular quantity of sexual energy that flows towards a defined object. It's fate, as it were, is decided by whether or not that object is available, socially appropriate, and receptive. Think of the Oedipal complex: the little boy's libido flows towards his mother, but this object is deemed inappropriate by society, so his energy is diverted elsewhere, and he resigns himself to accepting substitute objects. While it is well-known that Deleuze and Guattari reject the notion that the Oedipal complex is a universal explanation of how desire functions, what is not so well-known is that they also reject the restricted way Freud conceives of libido. Deleuze and Guattari vary his way of conceiving libido in two crucial ways: first, they set aside the idea that libido is necessarily singular – what we might for simplicity think of as the one subject one libido theory – in favour of a multi-channel idea of libido (i.e., multiplicity) – the one subject many libidos

⁴⁸ Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 21.

⁴⁹ Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 245.

⁵⁰ Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 27.

⁵¹ Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 240.

theory; second, rather than conceive it as flowing towards an object, they conceive it as a flow (or flows) without an object as such. "Freud himself recognizes the multiplicity of libidinal 'currents' that coexist in the Wolf-Man. That makes it all the more surprising that he treats the multiplicities of the unconscious as he does."⁵² Freud wants to reduce everything to the One, the father, the mother, me, but Deleuze and Guattari want to do the opposite: they want to think how it is possible for these multiple currents to flow side-by-side and, more importantly, to combine with other flows to produce new currents.

This brings us to the fourth and final characteristic of the plane of consistency to be derived from the kettle defence. Since the defences are neither connected to one another nor subsumed

by some greater whole they become "floating affects", as Deleuze and Guattari put it, that is to say charged particles sent into the world like so many missiles.⁵³ On the plane of consistency there "are only haecceities, affects, subjectless individuations that constitute collective assemblages. Nothing develops, but things arrive late or early, and form this or that assemblage depending on their compositions of speed. Nothing subjectifies, but haecceities form according to compositions of nonsubjectified powers or affects."⁵⁴ Thus, at last we get to the notion of affect, which it can now be said is the material form of becoming.

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⁵² Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 31.

⁵³ Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 267.

⁵⁴ Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 266.